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Learning Team-Optimality for Decentralized
Stochastic Control and Dynamic Games
Bora Yongacoglu, Gu¨rdal Arslan, and Serdar Yu¨ksel
Abstract—This paper presents decentralized learning algo-
rithms for stochastic dynamic teams and a class of dynamic
games. Analytical methods for finding optimal or equilibrium
policies are often inapplicable due to lack of prior knowledge on
the model, the cost function or the state dynamics. Reinforcement
learning offers a possible solution, but has not been fully explored
in the case of dynamic games with non-trivial state dynamics.
Existing learning methods are primarily applied to repeated
games where the same stage game is repeated by players with
no look ahead. In a recent paper, we provided a decentralized
algorithm for finding equilibrium policies in weakly acyclic
dynamic games, which contain dynamic teams as special case.
However, stochastic dynamic teams can possess equilibria with
arbitrarily high cost. Here, we present a reinforcement learning
algorithm and its refinements with probabilistic guarantees for
team optimality in the general class of common interest games
including dynamic teams. The algorithms presented here are
strictly decentralized in that they require only access to local
information such as cost realizations, previous local actions, and
state transitions.
Index Terms—Decentralized Stochastic Games; Stochastic
optimal control; Cooperative control; Game Theory; Machine
learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with learning algorithms for
stochastic dynamic team problems (also known as decen-
tralized stochastic control problems) as well as a class of
stochastic dynamic games, under a strict decentralization of
the information structure.
Stochastic dynamic games [9], [1], [6], [16] are a sig-
nificant generalization of both Markov decision processes
(MDPs) and of repeated games [10], and provide a frame-
work for studying cooperative decision making in a complex
environment. Unlike MDPs, stochastic dynamic games allow
for multiple decision makers, and unlike repeated games,
stochastic dynamic games allow for the stage game to evolve
according to the history of play.
Of particular interest are stochastic dynamic teams [12],
[35], in which all decision makers incur the same cost, and
common interest games [3], [26]. In finite state-action stochas-
tic dynamic teams, at least one team optimal policy (that is,
a joint policy that achieves the lowest expected discounted
cost for every initial state) is guaranteed to exist. Despite the
A conference version [32], currently under review, serves as an announce-
ment of the partial results presented here, namely the narrower versions of
only Theorem 1 and 3 specialized to stochastic teams and common interest
games, with only brief proof sketches and without details. Furthermore, the
conference version [32] does not contain the results on weakly acyclic games
and repeated games, namely Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
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incentive to coordinate, the problem of finding and playing a
team optimal policy is highly non-trivial due to incomplete
information and decentralization.
In this paper, we present a family of learning algorithms
for teams and common interest games, and prove that these
algorithms asymptotically achieve coordination on optimal
policies. Furthermore, our algorithms are appropriate for de-
centralized control, in that they do not require control sharing
among decision makers and require limited knowledge of the
system before play.
When critical information about the other decision makers,
the cost function, or the transition probabilities is unavail-
able, standard tools used in classical stochastic control for
recovering an optimal policy (e.g. dynamic programming,
linear programming, and convex analytic methods) cannot be
applied. Successful coordination on optimal policies requires
identifying the optimal policies, and in the event that there
are multiple optimal policies, there is the further issue of
selecting the one that will serve as the target for coordination.
One viable alternative to analytical methods is to use learning
algorithms, in which controllers simultaneously take actions
and attempt to learn the optimal policies.
A number of successful learning algorithms have been
developed for single-agent1 environments such as Markov
decision processes. Methods such as Q-learning [30] asymptot-
ically learn optimal policies in spite of incomplete information.
For the twin reasons that firstly multi-agent environments are
ubiquitous in applications [17] and secondly that analytical ap-
proaches are not possible under incomplete information, there
has been considerable interest in the study of reinforcement
learning in games. The analysis of learning in games is much
more difficult than that of single-agent learning: the presence
of multiple decision makers, each actively learning and mod-
ifying their behavior, results in a non-stationary environment,
hence the convergence results from the single-agent literature
are not guaranteed. In addition to the more complex, non-
stationary environment an agent faces, there are also strategic
considerations related to action selection. For discussion on the
problem of teaching while learning, see [24] and the references
therein.
Early works attempting to generalize modern reinforce-
ment learning methods to multi-agent settings were experi-
mental in nature: [27] studied Q-learning in a predator-prey
game, [23] considered Q-learning as applied to specific block
pushing task, and [5] considered both standard Q-learning and
a modified joint action learner in repeated teams. Though
conjectures were presented about the convergence of their
methods, these early papers lacked rigorous results.
A number of rigorous results followed shortly after the
experimental work, focusing primarily on zero-sum games
1The terms “agent” and “decision maker” are used interchangeably.
2and teams. References [14] and [13] developed the Nash Q-
learning algorithm, in which each decision maker maintains
joint-action Q-factors for itself and for every other decision
maker, and computes Nash equilibrium at each step. Under
uniqueness conditions, Nash Q finds equilibrium policies.
Friend-or-Foe Q-learning (FFQ) is presented in [18]. FFQ is
computationally inexpensive compared to Nash Q, and offers
guarantees under weaker conditions, but requires common
access both to the controls of all decision makers as well
as understanding of whether each other decision maker is
a ‘friend’ or ‘foe’. [29] presents an algorithm for playing
a stochastic game and proves that it converges to a team
optimal equilibrium in any stochastic team. More recently,
[36] presents an actor-critic algorithm for use in multi-agent
settings with rigorous guarantees. The results of both [29] and
[36] rely on common access to the past actions of other agents.
While these publications succeeded in finding optimal
policies in spite of incomplete information, the methods they
use require control sharing. That is, the actions taken by
one decision maker are required to be communicated to
or observed by other decision makers. In many interesting
applications, for instance when controllers are in different
physical locations and do not have communication channels
between them, control sharing is either impossible or severely
restricted. In such settings, the already difficult issue of multi-
agent learning is further complicated. On the one hand, the
evaluation of joint policies is complicated since individual
agents cannot refer to the actions of the remaining agents,
and on the other hand the set of all joint policies might not
be effectively searched.
Another practical objection to the use of control sharing
is that the number of joint actions grows exponentially in the
number of decision makers. If each decision maker is required
to keep a table of Q-factors for every state and joint action
pair, the problem quickly becomes intractable. In contrast,
while it lacks theoretical guarantees, direct application of
standard Q-learning (without reference to joint actions) is
sensible for at least this computational reason. Moreover, if
decision makers are oblivious to the existence of other decision
makers, then individual Q-learning is justifiable also from an
individual rationality point of view, since the decision makers
may believe they are facing a Markov decision process.
In light of these considerations among others, there has
been a steady interest in learning algorithms that allow for
greater decentralization but still come with rigorous guaran-
tees. [20] presents an algorithm for playing repeated games
with guarantees for maximizing the sum of payoffs across
agents. [19] provides three algorithms with provably desirable
convergence properties for use in repeated games. The meth-
ods presented there require no control sharing, and rely instead
on using the history of cost realizations to set an aspiration
level that will be used to determine whether the current action
choice is satisfactory. In the same vein, [4] provides an aspi-
ration learning algorithm for playing a repeated coordination
game. This method too does not use control sharing and
has desirable convergence properties, but was designed for
repeated games rather than for stochastic dynamic games;
one consequence of having a repeated game is that the cost
readings are noise-free unlike the stochastic dynamic setup;
some additional relations with [4] will be elaborated on further
in the paper. Another relevant reference is [22] which presents
a variant of log linear learning for repeated games and shows
that the stochastically stable outcomes are efficient (welfare-
maximizing) pure Nash equilibrium in games with at least
one pure Nash equilibrium. The stochastic imitation dynamics
introduced in [15] assigns probability one to efficient outcomes
in large class of repeated games. There are other learning
dynamics leading to efficient outcomes in repeated games
through player asynchronicity. For example, the adaptive play
dynamics in [34] has the property that the stochastically stable
outcomes maximize a potential function [21]. However, in
these type of dynamics, only one appropriately chosen decision
maker is allowed to update its decision at any period; hence,
some mechanism for coordinating the asynchronous decision
maker updates is needed.
Since there are no state dynamics in repeated games
and the decision makers have no look ahead, there are no
long run cost considerations to account for when selecting
actions, which allows the decision makers to focus on the
stage cost realizations alone when setting the aspiration levels.
In contrast, stochastic dynamic games have nontrivial state
dynamics that impact the long run cost of a policy, hence cost
“readings” are noisy and algorithm dependent, and the setting
of the aspiration levels are significantly more challenging.
In [2], we introduced Decentralized Q-learning, a two
timescale modification of Q-learning that provably finds mean-
ingful Q-factors and leads to equilibrium in any weakly acyclic
stochastic game, and in particular in any stochastic team. The
algorithm presented in [2] is decentralized in the sense that
agents use only local information and do not share controls.
However, the generality of this result comes at a cost: in
stochastic teams, there are in general both team optimal
equilibrium policies and suboptimal equilibrium policies, and
the suboptimal equilibrium can perform arbitrarily worse than
the optimal equilibrium. (A simple but illustrative example is
offered in Section II). Consequently, guarantees of finding an
equilibrium joint policy are not satisfactory in the context of
decentralized control when cost minimization is a design goal.
Contributions. In this paper, we present a decentralized
learning algorithm and its refinements for playing stochastic
common interest games, a class of games which model de-
centralized control problems and contain stochastic teams as
a special case. We give formal guarantees of convergence to
team optimal policies.
(i) In Theorem 1, we consider stochastic dynamic teams (or
more generally common interest games) and introduce an
algorithm, which only uses local action history and the
common state of the system, that provably converges to
a team optimal policy in a probabilistic sense to be made
precise in the paper. What makes this algorithm different
from our prior work [2] that only guaranteed convergence
to equilibrium policies but not necessarily to team optimal
policies, is the utilization of a finite window of the
most recent (noisy) cost scores to adaptively estimate
the lowest possible cost for each decision maker. Unlike
much of the relevant work, this algorithm does not require
control action sharing, and each decision maker can be
completely oblivious to the presence of other decision
makers in the system.
(ii) Theorem 2 strengthens Theorem 1 by showing that a
certain variant of our main algorithm leads to equilibrium
policies in a class of stochastic dynamic games, those
3that are weakly acyclic, while providing team optimality
in common interest games.
(iii) In Theorem 3, we obtain convergence to team-optimality
in a stronger-sense, namely almost sure convergence,
using constant aspirations under the stronger assump-
tion that the aspiration levels separate the team optimal
policies from the other policies. This convergence result
applies to a class of games that are larger than the
common interest games. In addition, Theorem 3 describes
the long term of the algorithm behavior with constant
aspirations in any stochastic dynamic game.
(iv) In Theorem 4, we consider the simpler case of repeated
games where the same stage game is repeated by decision
makers with no look ahead noise-free cost readings, and
obtain more general and stronger convergence results
than those in Theorem 1 by using the minimum cost
realizations in the entire past as the estimates of the
lowest possible cost for each decision maker.
As noted bove, prior work was either experimental with no
rigorous results, or when rigorous required too much informa-
tion sharing (in particular, control sharing). More recently, at-
tempts to decentralize have found some success in the stochas-
tic game setting, but have so far only guaranteed person-by-
person optimality, while we guarantee team optimality. To our
knowledge, the decentralized learning algorithms presented in
this paper are the first kind that achieves team optimality in
stochastic dynamic games without control sharing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
section II, we specify the model of finite stochastic teams
and dynamic games, introduce the problem, and provide the
relevant background. In section III, we present our main algo-
rithm and state a result on its long-term behavior for stochastic
teams and the more general class of common interest games.
Section IV is devoted to a variant of the main algorithm in the
context of weakly acyclic games, and strengthens a result from
[2]. Section V presents refinements of the main algorithm.
These refinements leverage additional information that may be
available a priori, and come with more powerful convergence
results. Section VI applies our results to the special setup of
repeated one-shot games (with no state). Section VII contains
numerical results from a simulation study, and Section VIII
concludes the paper. The proofs of our main technical results
are contained in the appendix.
We use the following notation throughout the paper. R
denotes the real numbers, N and N+ denote the nonnegative
and positive integers, respectively. P (·) and E(·) denote the
probability and the expectation, respectively, whereas, P(·)
denotes the set of probability distributions over a set. δx
denotes the Dirac distribution concentrated at x, whereas, U(·)
denotes the uniform distribution over a set. x ∼ f denotes an
independent draw x from the distribution f . 2X denotes the
set of subsets of X . (x)+ := max{x, 0}, for x ∈ R.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Stationary Markov Decision Processes and Q-learning
A (discounted) stationary Markov Decision Process (MDP)
is a discrete time process characterized by the following:
1) A finite set of states X
2) A random initial state x0 ∈ X
3) A finite set of control actions U
4) A discount factor β ∈ (0, 1)
5) A cost function c : X× U→ R
6) A transition probability kernel P (·|x, u) for determining
the next state given the current state-action (x, u) ∈ X×U
At time t ∈ N, the system is in state xt ∈ X and a decision
maker (DM) selects a control action ut ∈ U. DM then incurs
a stage cost c(xt, ut), and the system randomly transitions to
the next state, xt+1, according to the probability distribution
P (·|xt, ut). We assume that, prior to selecting ut at time t ∈
N, DM has access to the information It defined by
I0 = {x0}, It = It−1 ∪ {xt, ut−1, c(xt−1, ut−1)}, t ∈ N+.
A policy is a rule for selecting control actions based on the
information available. In principle, DM may use any function
of the available information. However, we can restrict our
attention—without loss of optimality—to the set of stationary
random policies, denoted ∆ := {π : X → P(U)}. Such
policies are also called stationary Markov policies. DM using
a policy π ∈ ∆ selects ut according to π(xt), for all t ∈ N. A
policy π ∈ ∆ induces a probability measure on the history of
states and actions, which in turn allows us to define the cost
Jx(π) := E
(∑
t∈N
βtc(xt, ut)
∣∣∣x0 = x), ∀x ∈ X
where ut is selected according to π(xt), for all t ∈ N.
DM is interested in finding a policy π∗ ∈ ∆ such that
Jx(π
∗) = infπ∈∆ Jx(π) for all x ∈ X. It is well-known (see,
for example, [11]) that there exists a stationary deterministic
policy that achieves this infimum. We will denote the set of all
stationary deterministic policies by Π which can be identified
with the set of mappings {π : X → U}. Note that Π ⊂ ∆ is
finite, while ∆ is uncountable.
When the cost function and transition kernel is known,
iterative methods such as value iteration can be used to
obtain an optimal policy. Otherwise, model-free reinforcement
learning techniques such as Q-learning [30] can be used to
recover an optimal policy. In standard Q-learning, DM begins
with arbitrary Q-factors Q0 ∈ R
X×U and updates its Q-factors
as
Qt+1(xt, ut) =(1− αt(xt, ut))Qt(xt, ut)
+ αt(xt, ut)(c(xt, ut) + βmin
v∈U
Qt(xt+1, v))
Qt+1(x, u) =Qt(x, u), ∀(x, u) 6= (xt, ut)
where αt(xt, ut) ∈ [0, 1] is the step-size at time t ∈ N. It has
been shown that if all state-action pairs are visited infinitely of-
ten and the step-sizes vanish properly, then P (Qt → Q
∗) = 1,
where Q∗ is the vector of (true) Q-factors, the unique solution
of a Bellman fixed point equation [31], [28].
Once the Q-factors Q∗ are attained, one can recover the
value function as V ∗(x) = minu∈UQ
∗(x, u) or an optimal
policy as π∗(x) ∈ argminu∈UQ
∗(x, u). Moreover, learned
Q-factors can be exploited during play: [25] presents a Q-
learning algorithm in which DM’s action selection converges
to that of an optimal policy.
The popularity of Q-learning in stationary MDPs is jus-
tified in that it is easy to implement and comes with a
theoretical guarantee for asymptotic recovery of an optimal
policy. However, this theoretical guarantee is predicated on
the stationarity of the system, i.e., when a state-action pair is
visited, the feedback received—which comes in the form of the
4cost realization and the state transition—is always generated
by the same Markovian source. If the system is not stationary,
then convergence to the Q-factors Q∗ is not guaranteed.
B. Stochastic Games and Decentralized Q-learning
A finite (discounted) stochastic game is a multi-DM gen-
eralization of a stationary MDP, and is characterized by
1) N ∈ N+ decision makers, the i
th one is denoted by DMi
2) A finite set of states X
3) A random initial state x0 ∈ X
4) For each DMi:
A finite set of control actions Ui
A discount factor βi ∈ (0, 1)
A cost function ci : X × U → R, where U := U1 ×
· · · × UN
5) A transition probability kernel P (·|x, u) for determining
the next state given the current state-joint action (x, u) ∈
X× U.
At time t ∈ N, the system is in state xt, and each DM
i
chooses a control action uit. While DM
i only selects uit, its
incurred cost is given by ci(xt, ut), where ut := (u
1
t , . . . , u
N
t ).
Following the play of this stage game, the system randomly
transitions to state xt+1 according to P (·|xt, ut). We consider
the situation in which DMi observes only the state variable
and its own actions. We assume that, prior to selecting uit at
time t ∈ N, DMi has access to the information Iit defined by
Ii0 = {x0}, I
i
t = I
i
t ∪ {xt, u
i
t−1, c
i(xt−1, ut−1)}, t ∈ N+.
In particular, DMi cannot see the past actions of the other
DMs, ujs, for any j 6= i, s ∈ N. This is in contrast to previous
works such as [29], [13], [18] and [36].
In analogy to MDPs, the goal for DMi is to minimize its
expected discounted long-term cost. Unlike the MDP setting,
DMi’s cost is also affected by the control actions of the other
DMs. Policies are defined as before. Though DMs may use any
policy that is measurable on the sigma field generated by the
available information, we will again restrict our attention on
stationary randomized policies (without loss of optimality in
team problems). For DMi, the set of stationary randomized
policies is denoted by ∆i := {πi : X → P(Ui)}. Such
policies are also called stationary Markov policies. The set
of deterministic stationary policies is denoted by Πi ⊂ ∆
and identified with the set of mappings {π : X → Ui}. We
let ∆ := ×Ni=1∆
i, Π := ×Ni=1Π
i, and ∆−i := ×j 6=i∆
j ,
Π−i := ×j 6=iΠ
j , for all i. We use the notation u−i to
refer to the joint actions of all DMs except DMi, that is,
u−i := (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uN ). We use similar notation
for policies. We sometimes write the joint actions and policies
as u = (ui, u−i) and π = (πi, π−i), respectively, for some i.
A joint policy π ∈ ∆ induces a probability measure on the
history of states and joint actions, which we use in defining
DMi’s cost
J ix(π) := E
(∑
t∈N
(βi)tci(xt, ut)
∣∣∣x0 = x), ∀x ∈ X
where uit ∈ U
i is selected according to πi(xt), for all i, t ∈
N. Then, each DMi’s goal is to select a policy πi ∈ ∆i to
minimize this cost.
Definition 1. A policy π∗i ∈ ∆i is called a best reply to
π−i ∈ ∆−i (for DMi) if
J ix(π
∗i, π−i) = min
πi∈∆i
J ix(π
i, π−i), ∀x ∈ X.
Any best reply π∗i ∈ ∆i to π−i ∈ ∆−i is called a strict best
reply with respect to (πi, π−i) if
J ix(π
∗i, π−i) < J ix(π
i, π−i), for some x ∈ X.
For any fixed π−i ∈ ∆−i, DMi faces a stationary MDP
problem; hence, DMi always has a deterministic best reply
to any π−i ∈ ∆−i. We denote the set of deterministic best
replies by
BRi(π−i) := {π∗i ∈ Πi : π∗i is a best reply to π−i}.
Moreover, we can describe the set BRi(π−i) using the Q-
factors Qiπ−i ∈ R
X×Ui , the unique fixed point of
Qiπ−i(x, u
i) =Eπ−i(x)
(
ci(x, ui, u−i)
+βi
∑
x′∈X
P (x′|x, ui, u−i) min
vi∈Ui
Qiπ−i(x
′, vi)
)
for all (x, ui) ∈ RX×U
i
, where Eπ−i(x) denotes the expecta-
tion with respect to the joint distribution of u−i determined
by π−i(x) := ×j 6=iπ
j(x). Then, BRi(π−i) can be expressed
as
BRi(π−i) = {πi ∈ Πi :Qiπ−i(x, π
i(x)) = min
vi∈Ui
Qiπ−i(x, v
i),
∀x ∈ X}.
Definition 2. A joint policy π∗ ∈ ∆ is called a (Markov
perfect) equilibrium if π∗i is a best reply to π∗−i, for all i.
Every finite discounted stochastic game has at least one
equilibrium joint policy [10]. Despite the existence of sta-
tionary deterministic best replies, the existence of a stationary
deterministic equilibrium policy is not guaranteed in general.
(When randomization is allowed, existence is guaranteed.)
Repeated zero-sum games, such as matching pennies and
rock-paper-scissors, offer simple examples of games without
stationary and deterministic equilibrium policies. However,
when restricting to the class of games we are interested
in, which model cooperative systems, we are guaranteed the
existence of deterministic equilibrium policies.
Definition 3. A stochastic game is called a stochastic team
(or simply a team) if
ci = c, βi = β, ∀i
where c and β denote the common cost function and the
discount factor of the team, respectively.
Definition 4. A joint policy π∗ ∈ ∆ is called team-optimal if
J ix(π
∗) = inf
π∈∆
J ix(π) ∀i, x ∈ X. (1)
We associate a team with a (centralized) stationary MDP
with the joint action set U. Any joint policy in ∆ would
be admissible for this MDP and thus the minimum cost for
this MDP would be a lower bound on the cost of a team-
optimal policy. Note that this centralized MDP would have
a stationary deterministic optimal policy π∗ : X → U.
5Since π∗ ∈ Π, π∗ would also be team-optimal. Therefore,
in a team, the set of deterministic team-optimal policies
Πopt := {π ∈ Π : π is team-optimal} is always non-empty.
The notion of team-optimality can be extended to a larger
class of stochastic games than teams.
Definition 5. A stochastic game is called a common interest
game if there exists a team-optimal policy satisfying (1). Such
a game is called a strict common interest game if
inf
π∈∆
∑
x∈X
J ix(π) <
∑
x∈X
J ix(π˜), ∀i
whenever π˜ ∈ ∆ is not team-optimal.
It is straightforward to see that a common interest game
always has a nonempty set Πopt of deterministic team-optimal
policies. Teams are a proper class within the strict common
interest games. The repeated game (|X|= 1) with the stage
cost functions shown in Figure 1 is a strict common interest
game for a, b > 0 (or a, b < 0 or a = b = 0) but not a team
unless a = b and β1 = β2.
u1
t
:
u2
t
:
1 2
1 a, b a+ 1, b+ 1
2 a+ 1, b+ 1 −a,−b
Fig. 1. Stage cost for a two-DM game where DM1 (DM2) chooses a row (a
column) and its cost is the first (the second) entry in the chosen cell.
It is immediate that a team-optimal policy is an equi-
librium; however, the converse need not be true. For an
illustration of how poorly an equilibrium policy can perform
with respect to team-optimality, consider again the repeated
game presented in Figure 1 with a = b > 0 and β1 = β2 = β.
Clearly, the joint policy πsub := (1, 1) is an equilibrium policy,
and so is the team-optimal policy π∗ := (2, 2). We have that
J i(πsub) − J
i(π∗) = 2a1−β , for all i ∈ {1, 2}, which shows
that the performance gap between an equilibrium policy and a
team-optimal policy can be arbitrarily large. This provides the
motivation for designing decentralized algorithms that allow
DMs to learn team-optimal policies (when they exist).
Our objective is the following. Given a finite discounted
stochastic team (or more generally a strict common interest
game), we wish to provide each DM with a decentralized
learning algorithm that does not use control sharing and that
provably leads, in some appropriate sense, to a team optimal
policy.
Reference [2] presented decentralized Q-learning algo-
rithms that lead to equilibrium policies in the class of weakly
acyclic games which includes the teams. These algorithms
instruct DMs to use the same stationary policy, called baseline
policies, for large number of consecutive stages, the collection
of which is called an exploration phase. At the end of an
exploration phase, DMs update their baseline policies in a
synchronized manner. In this way, the system is stationary for
long enough for Q-learning to return meaningful Q-factors.
The Q-factors acquired during an exploration phase are used
to construct best replies and the policy update process (based
on best replies with inertia) eventually leads to equilibrium
policies2. After this is achieved, DMs have no incentive to
change their policies, and so the play settles.
2That best reply dynamics with inertia lead to an equilibrium is a property
of weakly acyclic games.
In the next section, we present a decentralized learning
algorithm that leads to team-optimal policies (when they exist).
These algorithms build on the exploration phase technique
from [2], but also exploit the following structural result on
Q-factors in teams and strict common interest games.
Lemma 1. In a team (or more generally a strict common
interest game), we have, for all i, π∗ ∈ Πopt, π˜ ∈ Π \Πopt,∑
x∈X
Qiπ∗−i(x, π
∗i(x)) <
∑
x∈X
Qiπ˜−i(x, π˜
i(x)).
This fact provides for us an avenue for separating team-
optimal policies from the other policies by focusing on Q-
factors.
Proof. For all i, π∗ ∈ Πopt, π˜ ∈ Π \Πopt, we have∑
x∈X
Qiπ∗−i(x, π
∗i(x)) =
∑
x∈X
J ix(π
∗) <
∑
x∈X
J ix(π˜)
If π˜i ∈ BRi(π˜−i), then J ix(π˜) = Q
i
π˜−i(x, π˜
i(x)); otherwise,∑
x∈X
J ix(π
∗) ≤
∑
x∈X
min
ui∈Ui
Qiπ˜−i(x, u
i) <
∑
x∈X
Qiπ˜−i(x, π˜
i(x)).
III. LEARNING TEAM OPTIMALITY
In this section, we introduce a learning algorithm for
achieving team optimality in teams and strict common interest
games. To motivate our algorithm, we present the following
idealized update process on the set of joint policies Π.
Idealized Update Procedure (IUP) for DMi
Set parameters
• gi, hi : Πi × 2Π
i
→ P(Πi), policy update functions
• γi, κi ∈ (0, 1), exploration probabilities
Iterate k ≥ 0
If πk ∈ Πopt
πik+1 ∼ (1− γ
i)gi(πik, BR
i(π−ik )) + γ
iU(Πi)
Else
πik+1 ∼ (1− κ
i)hi(πik, BR
i(π−ik )) + κ
iU(Πi)
End
End
For any i, λ ∈ [0, 1], we define the policy update function
Ri,λ
i
: Πi × 2Π
i
→ P(Πi) as
Ri,λ(πi, Bi)(π˜i) :=


1, if πi ∈ Bi, π˜i = πi
λ, if πi 6∈ Bi, π˜i = πi
1−λ
|Bi| , if π
i 6∈ Bi, π˜i ∈ Bi
for all πi, π˜i ∈ Πi, Bi ⊂ Πi. Note that Ri,λ(πi, BRi(π−i))
would represent DMi’s best response to π−i with inertia λ.
Assumption 1. For all i,
gi = Ri,λ
i
where λi ∈ [0, 1] is DMi’s probability of inertia.
Assumption 1 implies that, if πk ∈ Πopt in the IUP, DM
i
updates its policy, with probability 1− γi, by best replying to
π−ik with inertia λ
i.
6Lemma 2. Consider a team (or more generally a strict
common interest game). Suppose that each DMi updates its
policies according to the IUP, and let Assumption 1 hold.
Let Aγ,κ denote the matrix of the transition probabilities for
the induced time homogenous Markov chain on Π, where
γ := {γi}Ni=1, κ := {κ
i}Ni=1. This Markov chain has a
unique stationary distribution µ∗γ,κ which satisfies: for any
ǫ, κ ∈ (0, 1), there exists γ¯ǫ(κ) > 0 such that γ
i ∈ (0, γ¯ǫ(κ)),
for all i, implies
µ∗γ,κ(Πopt) ≥ 1− ǫ/2. (2)
Moreover, for all µ0 ∈ P(Π), we have limn µ0A
n
γ,κ = µ
∗
γ,κ.
Proof. The induced Markov chain is irreducible, hence there
exists unique µ∗γ,κ such that µ
∗
γ,κ = µ
∗
γ,κAγ,κ. We have∑
π∗∈Πopt
µ∗γ,κ(π
∗) =
∑
π∗∈Πopt
∑
π∈Πopt
µ∗γ,κ(π)Aγ,κ(π, π
∗)
+
∑
π∗∈Πopt
∑
π/∈Πopt
µ∗γ,κ(π)Aγ,κ(π, π
∗)
≥
∑
π∈Πopt
µ∗γ,κ(π)
∏
i
(1− γi)
+
∑
π/∈Πopt
µ∗γ,κ(π)
∏
i
(κi/|Πi|)
This leads to∑
π∗∈Πopt
µ∗γ,κ(π
∗) ≥ 1−
∑
i γ
i∑
i γ
i +
∏
i(κ
i/|Πi|)
which implies (2). The last part follows from the aperiodicity
of the Markov chain.
Lemma 2 shows that if DMs were to follow the IUP then
they would choose a team-optimal policy in the long run
with arbitrarily high probability provided the experimentation
probabilities γ are sufficiently small but positive. However,
the IUP cannot be implemented unless DMs can ascertain
whether or not πk ∈ Πopt. Nevertheless, this motivates our
decentralized learning algorithm, which is presented below.
Algorithm 1 (for DM i)
Set Parameters
• Qi, a compact subset of RX×U
i
• Tk ∈ N+, for k ∈ N, the exploration phase lengths
(common to all DMs)
– Let tk+1 = tk + Tk, for all t ∈ N, where t0 = 0
• ρi ∈ (0, 1), an experimentation probability
• gi, hi : Πi × 2Π
i
→ P(Πi), policy update functions
• δi > 0, a tolerance for suboptimality when constructing
best-reply sets
• di > 0, a tolerance for sub-optimality when setting the
aspiration level
• {αin}n∈N, a sequence of step sizes such that
αin ∈ [0, 1]
∑
n∈N α
i
n =∞
∑
n∈N(α
i
n)
2 <∞
(e.g. ain = 1/n
r, for r ∈ (1/2, 1].)
• γi, κi ∈ (0, 1), policy experimentation probabilities
• λi ∈ [0, 1], a probability of inertia
• W i ∈ N+, a window length for setting aspiration levels
Select arbitrary πi0 ∈ Π
i and Qi0 ∈ Q
i
Receive the initial state x0
Iterate k ∈ N (kth exploration phase)
Iterate t = tk, tk + 1, . . . , tk+1 − 1
uit ∼ (1 − ρ
i)δπi
k
(xt) + ρ
iU(Ui)
Receive the cost ci(xt, ut)
Receive the next state xt+1 ∼ P (·|xt, ut)
nit, the number of visits to (xt, u
i
t) in the interval [tk, t]
Qit+1(xt, u
i
t) = (1 − α
i
ni
t
)Qit(xt, u
i
t)
+αi
ni
t
(ci(xt, ut) + β
iminvi∈Ui Q
i
t(xt+1, v
i))
Qit+1(x, u
i) = Qit(x, u
i), ∀(x, ui) 6= (xt, u
i
t)
End
BRik = {πˆ
i ∈ Πi : Qitk+1(x, πˆ
i(x))
≤ minvi∈Ui Q
i
tk+1(x, v
i)+δi, ∀x ∈ X}
Sik =
∑
x∈XQ
i
tk+1
(x, πik(x))
Λik = min{S
i
k−1, . . . , S
i
(k−W i)+}+ d
i
If Sik ≤ Λ
i
k
πik+1 ∼ (1− γ
i)gi(πik, BR
i
k) + γ
iU(Πi)
Else
πik+1 ∼ (1− κ
i)hi(πik, BR
i
k) + κ
iU(Πi)
End
Reset Qitk+1 to any Q
i ∈ Qi (e.g. project Qitk+1 onto Q
i)
End
Assumption 2. For all x, x′ ∈ X, there exists H ∈ N and
u˜0, . . . , u˜H ∈ U such that
P (xH+1 = x
′|x0 = x, uj = u˜j , ∀j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , H}) > 0.
Assumption 3. Assume, for all i, δi ∈ (0, δ¯), di ∈ (0, d¯),
ρi ∈ (0, ρ¯), where δ¯, d¯, ρ¯ are constants defined in Appendix A
that depend only on the game.
Theorem 1. Consider a team (or more generally a strict
common interest game) in which each DMi uses Algorithm 1,
and let Assumptions 1-3 hold. For any ǫ > 0, there exist
γ¯ǫ(κ) ∈ (0, 1), W¯ǫ(γ, κ) ∈ N+, T¯ǫ(γ, κ,Wmax) ∈ N+
where Wmax := maxiW
i such that if, for all i, k ∈ N
γi ∈ (0, γ¯ǫ(κ)), W
i ≥ W¯ǫ(γ, κ), Tk ≥ T¯ǫ(γ, κ,Wmax)
then
lim inf
k∈N
P (πk ∈ Πopt) ≥ 1− ǫ
Proof. See Appendix A.
Algorithm 1 is a two timescale recreation of the Idealized
Update Procedure (IUP) with πk ∈ Πopt replaced by S
i
k ≤ Λ
i
k,
where Sik is a cost score for DM
i’s performance at the k−th
policy evaluation step whereas Λik is a measure of DM
i’s best
performance during the last W i steps. Algorithm 1 is in the
spirit of aspiration learning algorithms [4], where Λik plays the
role of DMi’s aspiration level. However, unlike the aspiration
learning methods in the literature which focus on repeated
games with no state dynamics and DMs with no look ahead,
Algorithm 1 is designed for stochastic dynamic games with
nontrivial state dynamics and far-sighted DMs. Due to the long
7run cost considerations in dynamic stochastic games, noise-
free evaluation of the cost of policies in use are not available,
which leads to additional difficulties in setting the aspiration
levels.
In light of Lemma 1, a viable approach is to use the learned
Q-factors to produce cost scores and to set the aspiration
levels to the minimum cost score over some window of the
past. The scores obtained from the learned Q-factors are noisy
estimates of the “true scores” corresponding to the true cost
of the policies. In particular, setting the aspiration levels to
the minimum of the cost scores over the entire past based
on the learned Q-factors can result in unattainable aspiration
levels. Hence, to mitigate the effects of the noise present in
the learned Q-factors, we set the aspiration levels of each DMi
to the minimum cost score obtained over a finite window of
the most recent past within some tolerance. This allows DMs
to discard unattainable cost scores in finite time.
Another aspect of Algorithm 1 is the persistent experimen-
tation in the policy space. Experimentation when DMs feel
that they meet their aspiration levels (Sik ≤ Λ
i
k) is required
to prevent DMs settling in a policy that is not team-optimal.
This is due to the finite window approach used for setting
the aspiration levels and the possibility of setting suboptimal
aspiration levels. Experimentation when (Sik > Λ
i
k) is also
necessary to aid DMs in searching for team-optimal policies.
In repeated games with no state dynamics, DMs with no look
ahead, and noise-free cost measurements, there are no long
run cost considerations; hence, Algorithm 1 and its analysis
can be greatly simplified. Appendix D considers a simplified
form of Algorithm 1 for the repeated games setting.
IV. BEYOND TEAM OPTIMALITY: APPLICATION TO
WEAKLY ACYCLIC GAMES
In this section, we present a variant of Algorithm 1 with
desirable convergence properties in weakly acyclic games
(in addition to providing team-optimality in the sense of
Theorem 1).
Definition 6. A (possibly finite) sequence π0, π1, . . . in Π is
called a multi-DM strict best reply path if, for each k, πk and
πk+1 differ for at least one DM and, for each deviating DM
i,
πik+1 is a strict best reply with respect to πk.
Definition 7. A stochastic game is called weakly acyclic
under multi-DM strict best replies (or simply weakly acyclic)
if there is a multi-DM strict best reply path starting from
each deterministic joint policy and ending at a deterministic
equilibrium policy.
The notion of weak acyclicity introduced here is with
respect to the stationary Markov policies for stochastic games,
and generalizes the notion of weak acyclicity introduced in
[33] for single-stage games. All teams are weakly acyclic;
however, a common interest game need not be, see [8] for
other examples of single-stage weakly acyclic games.
Weakly acyclic games can be associated with the best reply
dynamics with inertia [2], which lead to equilibrium policies.
If the policy update functions gi, hi are chosen appropriately,
the IUP introduced in the previous section can be regarded
as a perturbed best reply dynamics with inertia, where {πk ∈
Πopt} can be replaced with any arbitrary event if the game is
not a common interest game (so long as the induced Markov
chain is time homogenous).
Assumption 4. For all i,
gi = hi = Ri,λ
i
where λi ∈ (0, 1) is DMi’s probability of inertia.
Assumption 4 strengthens Assumption 1 in that each DMi
always best replies with inertia when not experimenting.
Lemma 3. Consider a weakly acyclic game. Suppose that
each DMi updates its policies according to the IUP, and let
Assumption 4 hold. Let Aγ,κ denote the matrix of the transition
probabilities for the induced time homogenous Markov chain
on Π. This Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution
µ∗γ,κ which satisfies: for any ǫ > 0, there exists κ¯ǫ ∈ (0, 1)
such that max{γi, κi} ∈ (0, κ¯ǫ), for all i, implies
µ∗γ,κ(Πeq) ≥ 1− ǫ/4.
Moreover, there exists m¯ ∈ N (independent of γ, κ) such that
inf
m≥m¯,µ0∈P(Π)
(µ0A
m
γ,κ)(Πeq) ≥ 1− ǫ/2.
Proof. For all π ∈ Πeq,
Aγ,κ(π, π) ≥
∏
i
(1−max{γi, κi}) (3)
Let Lπ < |Π| be the length of a multi-DM strict best reply
path of minimal length from π ∈ Π \ Πeq to some π˜ ∈ Πeq,
and L := minπ∈Π\Πeq Lπ. There exists pmin ∈ (0, 1) (which
depends only on λ1, . . . , λN , |Π1|, . . . , |ΠN |, L) such that∑
π˜∈Πeq
(Aγ,κ)
L(π, π˜) ≥ pmin
∏
i
(1 −max{γi, κi})L (4)
for all π ∈ Π \Πeq. From (3)-(4), we have, for all k ∈ N,
(µ0A
k+L)(Π \Πeq) ≤L
∑
i
max{γi, κi}
+ (µ0A
k)(Π \Πeq)(1 − pmin).
This leads to, for all j, k ∈ N,
(µ0A
k+jL)(Π\Πeq) ≤ L
∑
i
max{γi, κi}/pmin+(1−pmin)
j .
Since |1− pmin|< 1, the desired result follows.
For small experimentation probabilities, the IUP under
Assumption 4 leads to equilibrium policies in the long run. We
will use this to show that Algorithm 1 under Assumptions 1-4
has the same long run behavior.
For weakly acyclic games, decentralized learning algo-
rithms which assign arbitrarily high probabilities to equilib-
rium policies in the long run are presented in [2]. However,
these algorithms do not provide any guarantee on achieving
team-optimality in teams or common interest games. We now
strengthen the results of [2] with respect to team-optimality.
Theorem 2. Consider a weakly acyclic game in which each
DMi uses Algorithm 1, and let Assumptions 2-4 hold. For any
ǫ > 0, there exist
κ˜ǫ ∈ (0, 1), γ˜ǫ(κ) ∈ (0, 1),
W˜ǫ(γ, κ) ∈ N+, T˜ǫ(γ, κ,Wmax) ∈ N+
8such that if, for all i, k ∈ N,
κi ∈ (0, κ˜ǫ), γ
i ∈ (0, γ˜ǫ(κ)),
W i ≥ W˜ǫ(γ, κ), Tk ≥ T˜ǫ(γ, κ,Wmax)
then
lim inf
k∈N
P (πk ∈ Πeq) ≥ 1− ǫ. (5)
Moreover, if the game is a strict common interest game, then
Πeq can be replaced by Πopt in (5).
Proof. See Appendix B.
V. LEARNING WITH CONSTANT ASPIRATIONS
In this section each DMi employs a constant aspiration
level Λi ∈ R. If there is at least one joint policy strictly achiev-
ing every DMi’s aspiration and the other joint policies do not
achieve any DM’s aspiration, then we show that DMs can
almost surely learn to use policies achieving their aspirations.
This is the case, for example, in a strict common interest game
when the aspiration levels are between the dominant costs and
the other costs. In a team problem, DMs can almost surely
converge to an optimal policy when their aspiration levels
are between the cost of optimal and suboptimal equilibria.
In a general game where no such aspiration achieving policies
exist, we show that DMs are likely to use a certain minimal
set of policies (equilibrium policies in weakly acyclic games)
in the long-run.
Algorithm 2 (for DM i)
Set Parameters
• Ji, Qi, compact subsets of RX, RX×U
i
, respectively
• Tk ∈ N+, for k ∈ N, the exploration phase lengths
(common to all DMs)
– Let tk+1 = tk + Tk, for all t ∈ N, where t0 = 0
• ρi ∈ (0, 1), an experimentation probability
• gi, hi : Πi × 2Π
i
→ P(Πi), policy update functions
• δi > 0, a tolerance for suboptimality when constructing
best-reply sets
• {αin}n∈N, a sequence of step sizes such that
αin ∈ [0, 1]
∑
n∈N α
i
n =∞
∑
n∈N(α
i
n)
2 <∞
(e.g. ain = 1/n
r, for r ∈ (1/2, 1].)
• {γin}n∈N, κ
i, policy experimentation probabilities
• λi ∈ (0, 1), a probability of inertia
• Λi ∈ R, an aspiration level
Select arbitrary πi0 ∈ Π
i, J i0 ∈ J
i, and Qi0 ∈ Q
i
Receive the initial state x0
Iterate k ∈ N (kth exploration phase)
Iterate t = tk, tk + 1, . . . , tk+1 − 1
uit ∼ (1− ρ
i)δπi
k
(xt) + ρ
iU(Ui)
Receive the cost ci(xt, ut)
Receive the next state xt+1 ∼ P (·|xt, ut)
mit, n
i
t, the number of visits to xt, (xt, u
i
t)
in the interval [tk, t], respectively
J it+1(xt) = (1 − α
i
mi
t
)J it (xt)
+αi
mi
t
(ci(xt, ut) + β
iJ it (xt+1))
Qit+1(xt, u
i
t) = (1− α
i
ni
t
)Qit(xt, u
i
t)
+αi
ni
t
(ci(xt, ut) + β
iminvi∈Ui Q
i
t(xt+1, v
i))
J it+1(x) = J
i
t (x), ∀x 6= xt
Qit+1(x, u
i) = Qit(x, u
i), ∀(x, ui) 6= (xt, u
i
t)
End
BRik = {πˆ
i ∈ Πi : Qitk+1(x, πˆ
i(x))
≤ minvi∈Ui Q
i
tk+1(x, v
i)+δi, ∀x ∈ X}
S˜ik =
∑
x∈X J
i
tk+1
(x)
If S˜ik ≤ Λ
i
πik+1 ∼ (1− γ
i
k)g
i(πik, BR
i
k) + γ
i
kU(Π
i)
Else
πik+1 ∼ (1− κ
i)hi(πik, BR
i
k) + κ
iU(Πi)
End
Reset J itk+1 , Q
i
tk+1 to any J
i ∈ Ji, Qi ∈ Qi, respectively
(e.g. project J itk+1 , Q
i
tk+1 onto J
i, Qi, respectively)
End
The following definition is introduced to describe the long-
term behavior of Algorithm 2.
Definition 8. For any i, η ∈ ∆, π ∈ Π, Λ ∈ RN , let
S˜i(η) :=
∑
x
J ix(η).
(i) Let
B˜R(π) := {π˜ ∈ Π : π˜i 6= πi ⇒ π˜i is a strict best reply
to π, ∀i}.
A nonempty set of policies Π˜ ⊂ Π is closed under multi-
DM strict best replies, or a cumber set, if
π ∈ Π˜⇒ B˜R(π) ⊂ Π˜.
A cumber set is minimal if it does not properly contain
another cumber set.
(iii) Let
B˜R
Λ
(π) := {π˜ ∈ Π : π˜i 6= πi ⇒ S˜i(π) > Λi and π˜i is a
strict best reply to π, ∀i}.
A nonempty set of policies Π˜ ⊂ Π is closed under multi-
DM strict best replies with aspiration levels Λ, or a Λ-
cumber set, if
π ∈ Π˜⇒ B˜R
Λ
(π) ⊂ Π˜.
A Λ-cumber set is minimal if it does not properly contain
another Λ-cumber set.
Let Πcumber and Π
Λ
cumber denote the union of minimal cumber
sets and the union of Λ-minimal cumber sets, respectively.
The repeated game (|X|= 1) with the stage cost functions
shown in Figure 2 is a strict common interest game for
β1 = β2. The minimal cumber sets are {(1,1),(2,1),(2,2),(1,2)}
and {(3, 3)}, which are also the minimal Λ−cumber sets for
Λ1 = Λ2 < 7. For Λ1 = Λ2 ∈ [7, 10), there are three
minimal Λ−cumber sets: {(2,1)}, {(1,2)}, and {(3, 3)}. For
Λ1 = Λ2 ∈ [10, 20), there are five minimal Λ−cumber
sets: {(1,1)}, {(2,1)}, {(2,2)}, {(1,2)}, and {(3, 3)}. For
Λ1 = Λ2 ≥ 20, any singleton {π}, where π ∈ Π, is a minimal
9u1
t
:
u2
t
:
1 2 3
1 10, 3 5, 7 20, 20
2 5, 7 10, 3 20, 20
3 20, 20 20, 20 0, 0
Fig. 2. Stage cost for a two-DM game where DM1 (DM2) chooses a row (a
column) and its cost is the first (the second) entry in the chosen cell.
Λ-cumber set. On the other hand, for Λ1 ≥ 10, Λ2 < 7, the
minimal Λ−cumber sets are {(1,1)}, {(2,2)}, and {(3, 3)}.
Allowing only single-DM best replies in the definition of
a cumber set results in the notion of a cusber set introduced
in [15]. The following are true, for any Λ ∈ RN .
• Π is both a cumber set and a Λ-cumber set.
• π ∈ Πeq ⇔ {π} is a (minimal) cumber set.
• π ∈ Πeq ⇒ {π} is a (minimal) Λ-cumber set.
• (π ∈ Π, S˜i(π) ≤ Λi, ∀i)⇒ {π} is a (minimal) Λ-cumber
set.
• There is a multi-DM strict best reply path from any π ∈
Π \Πcumber to Πcumber.
• There is a multi-DM strict best reply path from any π ∈
Π \ΠΛcumber to Π
Λ
cumber.
• Πcumber = Πeq ⇔ the game is weakly acyclic under
multi-DM strict best replies.
Let Lπ < |Π| be the length of a multi-DM strict best
reply path of minimal length from π ∈ Π \ Πcumber to some
π˜ ∈ Πcumber, and L := minπ∈Π\Πcumber Lπ.
Assumption 5. Assume, for all i, δi ∈ (0, δ¯), ρi ∈ (0, ρΛ),
where δ¯, ρΛ are constants defined in Appendix A, C, respec-
tively (δ¯ depends only on the game, whereas, ρΛ depends on
the game and Λ). Assume further that, for all i, n ∈ N,
γin ∈ [0, 1],
∑
n∈N γ
i
n <∞, and κ
i ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 3. Consider a discounted stochastic game where
each DMi updates its policies by Algorithm 2, and let As-
sumptions 2 and 5 hold.
1) Suppose that gi = Ri,1, ∀i, and there exists a nonempty
set ΠΛ ⊂ Π satisfying
S˜i(π∗) < Λi < S˜i(π˜), ∀i, π∗ ∈ ΠΛ, π˜ ∈ Π \ΠΛ. (6)
Then, there exist T˜k ∈ N+, k ∈ N, such that if Tk ≥ T˜k,
∀k, then
P (πk → π
∗, for some π∗ ∈ ΠΛ) = 1.
2) Suppose that gi = Ri,λ
i
, ∀i, and there exists a cumber
set ΠΛ satisfying (6). Then, there exists T˜k ∈ N+, k ∈ N,
such that if Tk ≥ T˜k, ∀k, then
P (πk → Π
∗, for a minimal cumber set Π∗ ⊂ ΠΛ) = 1.
3) Suppose that gi = Ri,1, hi = Ri,λ
i
, ∀i. Then,
lim inf
k∈N
P (πk ∈ Π
Λ
cumber) ≥ 1− (L/pmin)
∑
i
κi
for some pmin ∈ (0, 1) which is independent of
∑
i κ
i.
4) Suppose that gi = hi = Ri,λ
i
, ∀i. Then,
lim inf
k∈N
P (πk ∈ Πcumber) ≥ 1− (L/pmin)
∑
i
κi
for some pmin ∈ (0, 1) which is independent of
∑
i κ
i.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Algorithm 2 prescribes each DMi to update its policy
differently (using the policy update functions gi or hi cou-
pled with different experimentation probabilities γik or κ
i)
depending on DMi’s assessment of whether its aspiration is
achieved or not. The experimentation probability needs to
vanish asymptotically for the former case but be positive
throughout3 for the latter case. In practice, the experimentation
probabilities for either case are envisioned to be (asymptoti-
cally) small so that the policy updates are primarily governed
by gi and hi. With this in mind, Theorem 3 can be interpreted
as follows.
The first part of Theorem 3 assumes (i) each DMi stays
with its policy, i.e., gi = Ri,1, when it assesses that its
aspiration is achieved, (ii) each policy π ∈ Π achieves
either every DM’s aspiration (i.e., π ∈ ΠΛ) or no DM’s
aspiration (i.e., π 6∈ ΠΛ). With this (and regardless of hi),
DMs converge almost surely to an aspiration achieving policy.
Note that this does not rule out convergence to a strictly
dominated policy. The second part assumes (i) each DMi
uses its optimal response to the previous period’s joint policy
with some inertia in the case of achieved aspiration, i.e.,
gi = Ri,λ
i
, (ii) the aspiration achieving policies are closed
under multi-DM strict best replies (i.e., ΠΛ is a cumber set).
Under these conditions (and regardless of hi), DMs converge
almost surely to a subset of the aspiration achieving policies,
which is a minimal cumber set. Note that this rules out neither
persistent oscillations within a minimal cumber set (inside
the aspiration achieving policies) nor convergence to a set
of strictly dominated policies. However, in a weakly-acyclic
game (under multi-DM strict best replies), convergence to an
aspiration achieving equilibrium is guaranteed; in particular,
the equilibrium policies not achieving DMs’ aspirations are
ruled out. This implies convergence to an optimal policy
in teams if the aspiration levels are between the cost of
suboptimal and optimal equilibria. If ΠΛ is not a cumber set,
DMs can leave ΠΛ through multi-DM strict best replies and
the result may not hold.
Theorem 3 also predicts the long-term behavior of Al-
gorithm 2 when the joint policies Π cannot be partitioned
as aspiration achieving policies ΠΛ and the others Π \ ΠΛ
in the sense of (6). The third part of Theorem 3 assumes
that each DMi stays with its policy when its aspiration is
achieved, otherwise best replies with inertia, i.e., gi = Ri,1,
hi = Ri,λ
i
. With this (and regardless of the game), DMs’ long-
term probability of choosing a policy in a minimal Λ-cumber
set (a minimal set that DMs cannot exit through the strict
best replies of those whose aspirations are not achieved) can
be arbitrarily close to one if the experimentation probabilities
are sufficiently small. The fourth part assumes that each DMi
always best replies with inertia (when it is not experimenting),
i.e., gi = hi = Ri,λ
i
. With this (and regardless of the game),
DMs tend to choose policies in a minimal cumber set (the
equilibria and the minimal multi DM strict best reply cycles)
for small experimentation probabilities. Under the conditions
of the third or the fourth part, DMs may not consistently
achieve their aspirations.
3κi can be time-varying as long as it stay uniformly above zero.
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VI. APPLICATION TO REPEATED GAMES
Here, we consider Algorithm 1 when applied to repeated
games, where DMs repeatedly play the same single stage game
to minimize their single stage cost. Without long-run cost
considerations and perfect observations of the realized stage
cost (DMi observes ci(uk)), the body of the algorithm and the
proof of convergence can be greatly simplified.
Since the cost observations are noise-free, each DMi can
use all of its past cost realizations to determine its aspiration.
This is in contrast to Algorithm 1 applied to dynamic games in
Section III and IV where each DMi uses a finite length window
to set its aspiration so that unreasonably low cost realizations
due to noise introduced by Q-learning are forgotten. Due
to small but persistent experimentation, DMs’ aspirations
converge in finite time to their minimum possible cost. As
a result, convergence to strategies yielding minimum possible
cost to each DMi in strict common interest games readily
follows from the proof of Theorem 3. In fact, convergence to
aspiration achieving strategies within certain tolerance levels
are obtained in certain class of games more general than
strict common interest games. Essentially, convergence results
analogous to the ones in Theorem 3 are obtained for repeated
games without the knowledge of constant aspiration levels that
separate the aspiration achieving strategies and the others in
the sense of (6) (which translates to (7) in repeated games).
Algorithm 3 (for DMi)
Set parameters
• gi, hi : Ui × 2U
i
→ P(Ui) policy update functions
• di ≥ 0 a tolerance for not achieving the aspiration level
• λi ∈ (0, 1) a probability of inertia
• {γin}n∈N, κ
i, policy experimentation probabilities
Select arbitrary ui0 ∈ U
i
Iterate k ∈ N (kth stage game)
Receive cost cik := c
i(uk)
Set Λik := min{c
i
0, . . . , c
i
k−1}+ d
i
If cik ≤ Λ
i
k
uik+1 ∼ (1− γ
i
k)g
i(uik, BR
i
k(u
−i
k )) + γ
i
kU(U
i)
Else
uik+1 ∼ (1− κ
i)hi(uik, BR
i
k(u
−i
k )) + κ
iU(Ui)
End
End
Assumption 6. Assume, for all i, k ∈ N, γik, κ
i ∈ (0, 1).
Assume further that limn∈N
∏n
k=0
∏
i(1− γ
i
k/|U
i|) = 0, e.g.,
γik = γ
i ∈ (0, 1), or γik = a
i(1−e−1/(k+a
i)), for all i, k ∈ N,
where |Ui|≤ ai ≤ ∞.
Theorem 4. Consider a repeated game where each DMi
updates its decisions by Algorithm 3, and let Assumption 6
hold.
1) Suppose that gi = Ri,1, ∀i, and there exists a nonempty
set UΛ ⊂ U satisfying
ci(u∗) ≤ Λi < ci(u˜), ∀i, u∗ ∈ UΛ, u˜ ∈ U \ UΛ (7)
where Λi := minu∈U c
i(u) + di. Then,
lim sup
k∈N
P (uk ∈ U
Λ) ≥ 1−
lim supk∈N
∑
i γ
i
k∏
i(κ
i/|Ui|)
.
In addition,
lim
k∈N
∑
i
γik = 0⇒ lim
k∈N
P (uk ∈ U
Λ) = 1.
2) Suppose that gi = Ri,λ
i
, ∀i, and there exists a cumber
set UΛ satisfying (7). Then,
lim sup
k∈N
P (uk ∈ U
∗, for a minimal cumber set U∗ ⊂ UΛ)
≥ 1−
lim supk∈N
∑k+L−1
n=k
∑
i γ
i
n
min
{
pmin ,
∏
i(κ
i/|Ui|)
} .
In addition,
lim
k∈N
∑
i
γik = 0⇒ lim
k∈N
P (uk ∈ U
∗) = 1.
3) Suppose that gi = Ri,1, hi = Ri,λ
i
, ∀i. Then,
lim inf
k∈N
P (uk ∈ U
Λ
cumber)
≥ 1−
lim supk∈N
∑k+L−1
n=k
∑
imax{γ
i
n, κ
i}
pmin
.
4) Suppose that gi = hi = Ri,λ
i
, ∀i. Then,
lim inf
k∈N
P (uk ∈ Ucumber)
≥ 1−
lim supk∈N
∑k+L−1
n=k
∑
imax{γ
i
n, κ
i}
pmin
.
Proof. Due to Assumption 6, we have, for all i,
P (cik > min
u∈U
ci(u), ∀k ∈ [0, n])
≤
n−1∏
k=0
(1−min{γik, κ
i}/|Ui|)→ 0 as n→ 0.
Therefore,
P
(
Λik = Λ
i, for all i and all but finitely many k ∈ N
)
= 1.
Assume that Λik = Λ
i, for all i, k ≥ k˜, where k˜ ∈ N. The
rest of the proof follows from the proof of Theorem 3 (with
ǫk = 0, for all k ∈ N). Unlike in Theorem 3,
∑
i,k∈N γ
i
k <∞
does not hold here, hence, the weaker results.
Note that, for zero (or small) tolerance levels, the first
and the second parts of Theorem 6 imply convergence in
probability to strategies yielding minimum possible cost in
strict common interest games. Also, for positive tolerance
levels, convergence to strategies yielding minimum possible
cost within the tolerance levels are obtained if such strategies
exist in the sense of (7). For example, if the costs in a
team (or more generally in a strict common interest game)
are perturbed, the perturbed game would satisfy (7) provided
that the size of the perturbations are within sufficiently small
tolerance levels.
A different aspiration learning algorithm for repeated
games is presented in [4] where the aspiration levels are
adjusted according to the weighted average of the past rewards
(with infinite memory) subject to random perturbations. It was
shown in [4] that the frequency of playing an efficient strategy
can be made arbitrarily large in “coordination games”, which
are a class of games satisfying (7) for some tolerance levels
as well as additional conditions.
11
VII. A SIMULATION STUDY
We consider the following two DM stochastic team with
U1 = U2 = X = {1, 2} and common discount factor β = 0.8.
The stage cost for each state is presented in Figure 3.
u1
t
:
u2
t
:
1 2
1 1, 1 3, 3
2 3, 3 1, 1
xt = 1
u1
t
:
u2
t
:
1 2
1 10, 10 10, 10
2 10, 10 13, 13
xt = 2
Fig. 3. Stage cost for a two-DM game where DM1 (DM2) chooses a row (a
column) and its cost is the first (the second) entry in the chosen cell.
xt = 1 is the low cost state and xt = 2 is the high cost
state. The transition probabilities, given below, are constructed
so that when DMs successfully coordinate their decisions (that
is state-dependent) the state transitions with high probability
to the low cost state. Otherwise, the state transitions with high
probability to the high cost state.
P (xt+1 = 1|xt = u
1
t = u
2
t ) = 0.95
P (xt+1 = 2|xt 6= u
1
t or u
1
t 6= u
2
t ) = 0.95
In particular, when xt = 2, DMs are faced with the choice
between on the one hand incurring a lower short term cost 10
and likely remaining in the high cost state and on the other
hand paying a higher short term cost 13 with the hopes of
transitioning to the low cost state and avoiding sustained high
costs.
For sufficiently large discount factors (including β = 0.8
as selected), the unique team optimal policy is for both DMs
to coordinate as u1t = u
2
t = xt, for all t ∈ N. However, there
are three suboptimal equilibrium policies, namely (i) u1t =
u2t = 1, for all t ∈ N, (ii) u
1
t = u
2
t = 2, for all t ∈ N, (iii)
u1t = u
2
t 6= xt, for all t ∈ N.
We simulated Algorithm 1 and 2 with the following
parameter choices.
Case A: Algorithm 1, gi = hi = Ri,λ
i
, λi ∈ (0, 1)
κi = γi + 0.1, W i = 30, Tk = 10000
Case B: Algorithm 1, gi = hi = Ri,λ
i
, λi = 1
κi = 1, W i = 50, Tk = 5000
Case C: Algorithm 2, gi = hi = Ri,λ
i
, λi ∈ (0, 1)
κi = γi + 0.2, Tk = 7500
Case D: Algorithm 2, gi = hi = Ri,λ
i
, λi = 1
κi = γi + 0.2, Tk = 7500
where the aspiration level used in case C and D was chosen
without extensive tuning.
The algorithms performed generally as expected. The
disparity across different cases owes largely to the parameter
selections. In each case, the percentage of time where the joint
policies are team optimal, i.e., πk ∈ Πopt, are shown below.
Case γ = 0.05 γ = 0.01 γ = 0.005 γ = 0.001
A 0.638 0.902 0.922 0.972
B 0.432 0.776 0.864 0.952
C 0.648 0.908 0.960 0.984
D 0.242 0.564 0.720 0.914
As the experimentation probability γ is reduced, the em-
pirical frequency of the event πk ∈ Πopt increases and, for
γ = 0.001, the joint policies are team optimal for more
than %90 of the time. These numerical results confirm the
theoretical results.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we presented decentralized learning algo-
rithms for stochastic teams and dynamic games, and provided
rigorous results on the convergence to team optimal policies.
While previous studies have focused on repeated games, or
otherwise used a large degree of control sharing among deci-
sion makers to obtain convergence results, we have provided
a method for achieving team optimality in the broader class of
stochastic dynamic games without any control sharing during
play and with limited prior information about the game.
The proof methods used in this paper center on approxi-
mating the true process with time homogenous Markov chains
through a novel Dobrushin’s coefficient based analysis.The
algorithms presented are amenable to further variations and
can be modified as needed, and the Markov chain analysis
used for the convergence guarantees can likewise be easily
modified for more general applications.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let σ(A) ∈ [0, 1] denote the Dobrushin coefficient of an
n× n right stochastic matrix A, defined as [7]
σ(A) := min
i,k∈{1,...,n}
n∑
j=1
min{A(i, j), A(k, j)}.
Lemma 4. Consider an n× n right stochastic matrix A with
σ(A) > 0, and a sequence of n× n right stochastic matrices
{Ak}k∈N. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), if
sup
k∈N
‖Ak −A‖∞≤ τ :=
σ(A)ǫ
2n
(8)
then, for any probability vector µ0 of dimension n,
lim sup
k∈N
‖µ0A0 · · ·Ak − µ
∗‖1≤ ǫ
where µ∗ is the unique probability vector satisfying µ∗ = µ∗A.
Proof. Recall that ‖µA− νA‖1≤ (1−σ(A))‖µ− ν‖1, for all
probability vectors µ, ν; see [7]. Since σ(A) > 0, by Banach’s
fixed point theorem, there exists a unique probability vector µ∗
satisfying µ∗ = µ∗A, and limk µ0A
k = µ∗, for any probability
vector µ0.
From (8), we have supk∈N|σ(Ak) − σ(A)|≤ nτ , which
implies supk∈N(1 − σ(Ak)) ≤ ρ := 1− σ(A)/2 ∈ (0, 1). We
write
‖µ0A0 − µ
∗‖1 = ‖µ0A0 − µ
∗A‖1
≤ ‖µ0A0 − µ
∗A0‖1+‖µ
∗A0 − µ
∗A‖1
≤ (1− σ(A0))‖µ0 − µ
∗‖1+nτ
≤ ρ‖µ0 − µ
∗‖1+nτ
Repeated application of these inequalities result in
‖µ0A0 . . . Ak−1 − µ
∗‖1≤ρ
k‖µ0 − µ
∗‖1+ǫ, ∀k.
Since limk ρ
k‖µ0 − µ
∗‖1= 0, the lemma follows.
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Proof of Theorem 1
Let ǫ, κ ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 2, there exists γ¯ǫ(κ) such that
maxi γ
i ∈ (0, γ¯ǫ(κ)) implies µ
∗
γ,κ(Πopt) ≥ 1− ǫ/2, where µ
∗
γ
is the unique invariant measure of the Markov chain induced
by the IUP. Assume maxi γ
i ∈ (0, γ¯ǫ(κ)).
For all k ∈ N, π, π′ ∈ Π, we define
µk(π) := P (πk = π) (9)
Ak(π, π
′) := P (πk+1 = π
′|πk = π) (10)
where πk is the joint baseline policy during the k−th explo-
ration phase of Algorithm 1. Note that µk+1 = µ0A0 · · ·Ak.
To prove the theorem, we will show lim supk∈N‖µk−µ
∗
γ‖1≤
ǫ/2. Due to Lemma 4 and σ(Aγ,κ) > 0, it is sufficient to
show
‖Ak −Aγ,κ‖∞≤ τ :=
σ(Aγ,κ)ǫ
4|Π|
(11)
for all but finitely many k ∈ N. To ensure (11), we will
introduce an event Rk such that, for all π, π
′ ∈ Π, and all but
finitely many k ∈ N,
P (πk+1 = π
′|πk = π,Rk) = Aγ,κ(π, π
′) (12)
and show that
Pr(Rk|πk = π) ≥ 1− τ (13)
by choosing the parameters of Algorithm 1 appropriately. Note
that (12)-(13) imply (11) as follows:
Aγ,κ(π, π
′)− τ
≤ Aγ,κ(π, π
′)(1 − τ)
≤ Aγ,κ(π, π
′)P (Rk|πk = π)
+ Pr(πk+1 = π
′|πk = π,R
c
k)P (R
c
k|πk = π)
= Ak(π, π
′)
≤ Aγ,κ(π, π
′) · 1 + 1 · P (Rck|πk = π)
≤ Aγ,κ(π, π
′) + τ
where Rck denotes the complement of Rk.
Define
δ¯ := min{|Qiπ−i(x, u)−Q
i
π−i(x, v)|> 0 :
i, π−i ∈ Π−i, x ∈ X, u, v ∈ Ui} (14)
Si(π) :=
∑
x∈X
Qiπ−i(x, π
i(x)), ∀π ∈ ∆
d¯ :=
1
2
min{|Si(π) − Si(π˜)|> 0 : i, π, π˜ ∈ Π}.
Let π¯ik ∈ ∆
i denote the policy used by DMi in the k−th
exploration phase, i.e., π¯ik(x) := (1 − ρ
i)δπi
k
(x) + ρ
iU(Ui),
∀x ∈ X. Let ρ¯ > 0 be such that maxi ρ
i ∈ (0, ρ¯) implies
‖Qi
π−i
k
−Qi
π¯−i
k
‖∞ <
1
2
min{δi, δ¯ − δi}, ∀i, k ∈ N
|Si(πk)− S
i(π¯k)| <
1
2
min{di, d¯− di}, ∀i, k ∈ N.
Such ρ¯ exists due to [2, Lemma 3]. Assume that, for all i,
di ∈ (0, d¯), δi ∈ (0, δ¯), ρi ∈ (0, ρ¯). Assume further that
W i ≥ W¯ǫ(γ, κ) := min{W ∈ N : (1− φ)
W < φτ/3}, ∀i
where φ :=
∏
imin{γ
i/|Πi|, κi/|Πi|} ∈ (0, 1).
For any k ≥Wmax, we define the event
Rk := Fk ∩
Wmax⋂
ℓ=0
Gk−ℓ ∩
W¯ǫ(γ,κ)⋃
ℓ=1
Hk−ℓ
where
Fk := {‖Q
i
tk+1
−Qi
π−i
k
‖∞< min
i
{δi, δ¯ − δi}/2, ∀i}
Gk := {|S
i
k − S
i(πk))|< min{d
i, d¯− di}/2, ∀i}
Hk := {πk ∈ Πopt}.
Conditioned on Rk, k ≥Wmax, we have, for all i,
BRik = BR
i(π−ik )
and
Sik ≤ Λ
i
k ⇔ πk ∈ Πopt.
This implies (12), for all k ≥Wmax. We will now show (13)
for sufficiently large exploration lengths Tk.
By [2, Lemma 4], there exists Tǫ(γ, κ,Wmax) ∈ N+ such
that if mink∈N Tk ≥ Tǫ(γ, κ,Wmax), we have
P (Fk), P (Gk) ≥ 1− φτ/(3Wmax).
This implies, for k ≥Wmax,
P (∩Wmaxℓ=0 Gk−ℓ) ≥ 1− φτ/3.
In addition, we have, for k ≥Wmax,
P (Hk) ≥1− (1 − φ)
W¯ǫ(γ,κ) ≥ 1− φτ/3.
All together, the preceding imply, for k ≥Wmax,
P (Rk) ≥ 1− φτ. (15)
Since infk∈N,π∈Π P (πk = π) ≥ φ > 0, (15) implies (13).
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Lemma 5. Consider an n×n right stochastic matrix A, and
a sequence of n× n right stochastic matrices {Ak}k∈N. For
any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), m ∈ N, if
sup
k∈N
‖Ak −A‖∞≤ ǫ/(2nm) (16)
then
sup
k∈N,µ0
‖µ0Ak · · ·Ak+m−1 − µ0A
m‖1≤ ǫ/2
where µ0 is any probability vector of dimension n.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Assume
0 < κi < κ˜ǫ := min{κ¯ǫ, ǫ/(4|Π|m¯N)}, ∀i
where κ¯ǫ and m¯ are as in Lemma 3. Then, assume
0 < γi < γ˜ǫ(κ) := min{γ¯ǫ(κ), κ˜ǫ}, ∀i
where γ¯ǫ(κ) is as in Lemma 2. With these choices of γ, κ,
Lemma 3 holds, i.e.,
inf
µ0∈P(Π)
(µ0A
m¯
γ,κ)(Πeq) ≥ 1− ǫ/2. (17)
We have, for all k ∈ N,
‖Ak −Aγ,κ‖∞≤ 1−
∏
i
(1−max{γi, κi})
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×min
π∈Π
P (BRik = BR
i(π−i), ∀i|πk = π)
(18)
where Ak is as in (10). By [2, Lemma 4], there exists Tǫ ∈ N+
such that if Tk ≥ Tǫ,
min
π∈Π
P (BRik = BR
i(π−i), ∀i|πk = π) ≥ 1−
ǫ
4|Π|m¯N
.
(19)
Assume that, for all i, k ∈ N,
W i ≥ W˜ǫ(γ, κ) := W¯ǫ(γ, κ)
Tk ≥ T˜ǫ(γ, κ,Wmax) := max{Tǫ, T¯ǫ(γ, κ,Wmax)}
where W¯ǫ(γ, κ), T¯ǫ(γ, κ,Wmax) are as in Theorem 1. By (18)-
(19) and the assumptions on γ, κ, {Tk}k∈N , we have
sup
k∈N
‖Ak −Aγ,κ‖∞≤ ǫ/(2|Π|m¯N).
Lemma 5 implies
sup
k∈N,µ0∈P(Π)
‖µ0Ak · · ·Ak+m¯−1 − µ0A
m¯
γ,κ‖1≤ ǫ/2. (20)
The desired result for weakly acyclic games follows from (17)-
(20). Note that the parameter choices satisfy the hypothesis of
Theorem 1; hence, the results of Theorem 1 also hold.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let δ¯i be as in (14), and let ρΛ ∈ (0, 1) be such that
ρi ∈ (0, ρΛ), for all i, implies
‖Qi
π−i
k
−Qi
π¯−i
k
‖∞<
1
2
min{δi, δ¯ − δi}, ∀i, k ∈ N
and
|S˜i(πk)− S˜
i(π¯k)|< min
π∈Π
|Λi − Si(π)|, ∀i, k ∈ N
where π¯ik(xk) = (1 − ρ
i)δπi
k
(xk) + ρ
iU(Ui). Such ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1)
exists due to [2, Lemma 3].
Let ǫk ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ N, be such that
∑
k∈N ǫk < ∞. Due
to [2, Lemma 1], there exists finite integers T˜k ∈ N+, k ∈ N
such that if Tk ≥ T˜k, for all k ∈ N,
P (|S˜ik − S˜
i(π¯k)|< ǫk, ‖Q
i
tk+1
−Qi
π¯−i
k
‖∞< ǫk, ∀i) ≥ 1− ǫk.
Assume now Tk ≥ T˜k, for all k ∈ N. Hence, there exists
k˜ ∈ N+ such that, for all i, k ≥ k˜,
P (Ek) ≥ 1− ǫk
where
Ek :={((πk ∈ Π
Λ, S˜ik < Λ
i) or (πk 6∈ Π
Λ, S˜ik > Λ
i)),
BRik = BR
i(π−ik ), ∀i}.
1) We have, for all k ≥ k˜,
P (πk+1 ∈ Π
Λ|πk ∈ Π
Λ) ≥ (1− ǫk)
∏
i
(1− γik)
P (πk+1 ∈ Π
Λ|πk 6∈ Π
Λ) ≥ (1− ǫk)
∏
i
(κi/|Πi|).
This leads to, with some algebra, for all k ≥ k˜,
P (πk+1 6∈ Π
Λ) ≤
(
1−
∏
i
(κi/|Πi|)
)
P (πk 6∈ Π
Λ)
+ ǫk +
∑
i
γik.
Since
∣∣∣1 − ∏i(κi/|Πi|)∣∣∣ < 1, ∑k∈N ǫk < ∞, and∑
i,k∈N γ
i
k < ∞, we have
∑
k∈N P (πk 6∈ Π
Λ) < ∞.
Borel-Cantelli Lemma implies
P (πk 6∈ Π
Λ, for infinitely many k ∈ N) = 0.
Also,
∑
k∈N P ((πk ∈ Π
Λ, S˜ik ≥ Λ
i) <∞, hence
P (πk ∈ Π
Λ, Sik ≥ Λ
i, for infinitely many k ∈ N) = 0.
This proves the first part.
2) We have, for all k ≥ k˜,
P (πk+1 ∈ Π
Λ ∩ Πcumber|πk ∈ Π
Λ ∩ Πcumber)
≥ (1 − ǫk)
∏
i
(1 − γik).
There exists pmin ∈ (0, 1) (which depends only on
λ1, . . . , λN , |Π1|, . . . , |ΠN |, L) such that, for all k ≥ k˜,
P (πk+L ∈ Π
Λ ∩ Πcumber|πk ∈ Π
Λ \Πcumber)
≥ pmin
k+L−1∏
n=k
(1− ǫn)
∏
i
(1 − γin) (21)
and
P (πk+L ∈ Π
Λ ∩Πcumber|πk 6∈ Π
Λ)
≥
∏
i
(κi/|Πi|)
k+L−1∏
n=k
(1− ǫn)
∏
i
(1− γin).
This leads to, for all k ≥ k˜,
P (πk+L 6∈ Π
Λ ∩ Πcumber)
≤
(
1−min
{
pmin ,
∏
i
(κi/|Πi|)
})
× P (πk 6∈ Π
Λ ∩ Πcumber)
+
k+L−1∑
n=k
ǫn +
k+L−1∑
n=k
∑
i
γin.
Since
∣∣∣1 − min{pmin,∏i κi|Πi|}∣∣∣ < 1, ∑k∈N ǫk < ∞,
and
∑
i,k∈N γ
i
k < ∞, we have
∑
j∈N P (πk+jL 6∈
ΠΛ ∩ Πcumber) < ∞, for all k ∈ N. This results in∑
k∈N P (πk 6∈ Π
Λ ∩ Πcumber) < ∞. Borel-Cantelli
Lemma implies
P (πk 6∈ Π
Λ ∩ Πcumber, for infinitely many k ∈ N) = 0.
Also
∑
k∈N P (BR
i
k 6= BR
i(π−ik )) <∞, hence,
P (BRik 6= BR
i(π−ik ), for infinitely many k ∈ N) = 0.
This proves the second part.
3) We have, for all k ≥ k˜,
P (πk+L ∈ Π
Λ
cumber|πk ∈ Π
Λ
cumber)
≥
k+L−1∏
n=k
(1− ǫn)
∏
i
(1−max{γin, κ
i}).
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We also have, for all k ≥ k˜,
P (πk+L ∈ Π
Λ
cumber|πk 6∈ Π
Λ
cumber)
≥ pmin
k+L−1∏
n=k
(1 − ǫn)
∏
i
(1−max{γin, κ
i})
where pmin ∈ (0, 1) is as in (21). This leads to, for all
k ≥ k˜,
P (πk+L 6∈ Π
Λ
cumber) ≤
k+L−1∑
n=k
(
ǫn +
∑
i
max{γin, κ
i}
)
+ (1− pmin)P (πk 6∈ Π
Λ
cumber).
Since |1 − pmin|< 1 and limk∈N
∑k+L−1
n=k ǫn = 0, we
have, for all k ∈ N,
lim sup
j∈N
P (πk+jL 6∈ Π
Λ
cumber)
≤ lim sup
j∈N
k+(j+1)L−1∑
n=k+jL
∑
i
max{γin, κ
i}/pmin.
This proves the third part.
4) It follows exactly the same as the third part by replacing
ΠΛcumber with Πcumber.
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